













occasion	for	predicates,	prime	matter	permits	that	concurrence	of	predicates	which	is	concreteness’	(Williams	1958,	p.	508),	which	is	not	all	that	helpful	really.			 At	this	point,	one	could	adopt	a	kind	of	Lockean	‘primitivist’	stance	and	acknowledge	that	not	only	can	we	not	say	what	substance	is,	since	by	‘being	the	occasion	for	predicates’	it	lies	beyond	them,	but	we	can’t	say	how	it	does	what	it	does.	Alternatively,	we	could	analyse	further	this	notion	of	‘being	the	occasion	of	predicates’,	running	the	risk	perhaps	of	regress.	Or	we	could	throw	our	hands	in	the	air	and	declare	substance	to	be	metaphysically	otiose.	This	is	more	or	less	Paul’s	reaction:			‘I	reject	the	notion	that	we	need	more	than	one	ontological	category	to	provide	the	ontological	structure	that	substantial	categorical	priority	was	traditionally	invoked	to	support.	In	effect,	the	idea	is	that	the	categorical	difference	between	substance	and	property	should	be	collapsed	at	the	fundamental	level,	since	we	can	use	purely	qualitative	entities—perhaps	relations	and	fusions	of	n-adic	properties—to	build	the	fundamental	external	and	internal	structure	of	Reality.’	(Paul	2013,	p.	109)		In	this	rejection	we	can	see	a	resonance	with	the	work	of	Cassirer	and	Eddington,	both	of	whom	advocated	a	shift	from	things-as-substances	to	relations	as	the	ground	of	objectivity	in	science	(French	2003;	French	2014	pp.	79-83	and	pp.	91-99).	For	them,	as	noted	already,	if	such	things-as-substances,	or	objects,	could	not	be	regarded	as	individuals,	according	to	quantum	mechanics,	then	they	should	be	dispensed	with.	Given	that	we	can	so	regard	them,	subject	to	certain	caveats,	the	argument	has	shifted,	as	also	indicated	above:	now	it's	the	ambiguity	regarding	whether	they	can	be	said	to	have	an	‘individuality	profile’	that	motivates	their	elimination.	But	of	course,	even	if	one	were	to	adopt	the	objects-as-individuals	horn	of	the	underdetermination,	one	might	still	prefer	not	to	accept	substance	into	one’s	metaphysical	pantheon,	adopting	instead,	say,	Muller’s	and	Saunders’	relations	based	approach	to	individuality	in	the	quantum	context	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008;	but	for	concerns,	see	Norton	2015).		 Paul’s	response	is	motivated	not	only	by	the	idea	that	we	don’t	need	substance	to	build	a	world,	as	it	were,	but	also	that	it	actually	creates	metaphysical	problems	where	none	need	exist.	Thus	she	invites	us	to	consider	recent	debates	over	the	nature	of	laws	(I’ll	come	back	to	this),	where,	she	argues,	the	implicit	categorical	bias	towards	substance	‘…	creates	the	need	for	an	explanation	of	what	the	underlying	causal	or	counterfactual	connections	are	between	the	parts	that	are	strung	together	to	give	the	overall	pattern	of	the	mosaic’	(2013	p.	102).	For	advocates	of	the	Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley	view	this	need	for	an	explanation	is	satisfied,	ultimately,	by	the	necessary	connections	existing	between	the	relevant	universals	and	one	can	then	account	for	the	supposed	governing	function	of	laws	in	these	terms;	for	dispositionalists,	it	is	the	powers	manifested	by	the	relevant	parts	of	the	mosaic	that	do	all	the	explanatory	work.			 However,	if	we	reject	substantial	categorical	priority,	as	Paul	argues,	there	is	simply	no	need	for	any	such	explanation	and	likewise	no	need	to	make	sense	of	the	supposed	governance	of	laws.	Instead,	‘[w]hat	makes	it	the	case	that	we	have	a	particular	linking	of	properties	and	relations	…	is	simply	the	existence	
of	the	fundamental	distributional	property	that,	in	effect,	is	the	pattern.’	(Paul	2013,	pp.	102-103).	As	she	says,	this	can	be	viewed	as	a	‘new	sort	of	Humeanism’,	in	that	‘[t]he	distributional	property	guides	the	pattern	…	across	locations	by	being	more	fundamental	than	that	pattern,	and	supports	counterfactual	and	causal	inferences	across	times	by	being	the	more	fundamental	thing	that	simply	exists	at	the	different	locations.’	(ibid.,	p.	103).			 As	I	said,	I’ll	come	back	to	this	issue	of	how	we	should	understand	laws	from	a	structuralist	perspective	shortly	but	for	the	moment	I	want	to	focus	on	the	nature	of	these	fundamental	distributional	properties.	Thus,	according	to	Paul,	instead	of	thinking	of	properties	as	that	which	need	to	be	‘occasioned’	by	substance,	we	can	take	them,	understood	n-adically	to	include	relations,	as	our	fundamental	‘building	blocks’	and	construct	the	‘structure	of	Reality’	on	that	basis	via	an	operation	of	‘fusion’.	She	takes	the	latter	from	what	she	calls	the	‘traditional	spatiotemporal	view’	of	world	building:		‘On	this	view,	the	material	world	is	a	kind	of	glued-together	jigsaw	puzzle	constructed	using	spatiotemporal	composition	as	the	glue.	The	effect	of	this	method	of	building	is	that	properties	of	larger	spatiotemporal	regions	are	built	by	spatiotemporally	fusing	together	smaller,	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	regions.	In	other	words,	on	the	spatiotemporal	view,	properties	of	larger	regions	are	constructed	via	the	spatiotemporal	fusion	of	their	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	parts,	so	the	qualitative	character	of	a	larger	spatiotemporal	region	supervenes	on	the	spatio-	temporal	fusion	of	its	smaller	spatiotemporal	parts.’	(Paul	2012,	p.	227).		Thus,	‘the	compositional	structure	of	the	material	world	derives	from	the	fusion	of	spatiotemporal	parts’	(ibid.,	p.	229).	Here	Paul	rejects	the	emphasis	on	spatio-temporality	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	incompatible	with	the	foregrounding	of	configuration	space	in	certain	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics.	Leaving	to	one	side	the	concern	that	this	may	not	seem	such	a	powerful	motivation	to	some,	Paul	advocates	an	alternative	‘mereological	bundle	theory’,	according	to	which,		‘The	overall	structure	of	the	world	is	created	by	the	fusion	of	fundamental	properties,	not	by	fusions	of	fundamental	localized	particles	or	their	equivalents,	qualitatively	rich	spatiotemporal	regions,	leaving	room	for	the	likely	possibility	that	some	of	the	fundamental	properties	fused	to	make	the	world	are	holistic	properties	effectively	distributed	across	a	region.’	(ibid.,	p.	244)		Particles	can	then	be	reconceptualised	as	‘fusions’	of	n-adic	properties	in	a	move	that,	again,	resonates	with	the	core	of	OSR.	Indeed,	Paul	herself	notes	that	the	kinds	of	qualitative	entities,	such	as	relations,	that	she	is	concerned	with	‘…	can	serve	as	structural	‘nodes’	and	can	be	arranged	into	the	appropriate	patterns’	(2013,	p.	110)	and	that	her	view	‘…	may	also	complement	an	even	more	radical	sort	of	structuralism,	the	ontic	structuralism	of	Ladyman	(1998)	and	French	and	Ladyman	(2003)	’	(ibid.).	From	this	perspective,	the	claim	that	‘there	are	no	objects’	amounts	to	saying	that	‘we	collapse	the	difference	between	object,	property	and	substance’	so	that	‘collections	or	fusions	of	purely	qualitative	entities	can	perfectly	well	serve	as	non-relational	nodes	for	a	relational	structure	that	fits	the	empirical	constraints	of	the	ontic	structuralist.’	(ibid.,	pp.	110-111).4		




Minkowski	spacetime).	Likewise,	as	we’ve	seen,	we	can	understand	the	distinction	in	statistical	behaviour	that	we	label	‘bosonic’	and	‘fermionic’	in	terms	of	the	symmetric	and	anti-symmetric	representations	of	the	permutation	group,	respectively.	From	this	perspective,	‘sociability’	is	just	the	metaphysical	counterpart	of	the	above	physical	connection.	Nevertheless,	there	is	further	metaphysical	work	to	be	done.	Just	as	one	might	wonder	what	is	involved	in	‘fusing’	properties,	so	one	might	ask	for	further	details	on	the	nature	of	this	‘dropping	out’	–	the	difference	being	that	in	the	former	case	we	lacked	a	physical	analogue,	whereas	in	the	latter	we	don’t	have	an	appropriate	metaphysics.			 As	mentioned	above,	in	(French	2014)	it	was	suggested	that,	as	far	as	those	features	to	do	with	symmetries	are	concerned,	the	structure-property	relationship	can	be	captured	by	that	between	determinables	and	determinates	(for	an	overview,	see	Wilson	2017).5		Our	question	now	is:	can	we	say	more	about	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	itself	(or	at	least,	more	than	is	given	in	French	2014)?		 It	turns	out	that	we	can.	Denby	(2001)	offers	an	interesting	formal	schema	that	the	structural	realist	can	appropriate	as	a	further	metaphysical	tool	to	help	explicate	the	relationship	between	structure	and	properties.	It	may	not	seem	that	this	appropriation	is	appropriate,	given	the	object-oriented	nature	of	Denby’s	device,	but	the	structural	realist	has	the	means	to	‘re-tool’	it	to	her	purposes,	as	we’ll	see.		 The	core	idea	is	to	think	of	a	determinable	as	a	‘classification’	of	particulars	(and	here	we	might	immediately	think	of	the	Wignerian	programme	that	underpins	the	above	relationship	between	symmetry	and	kinds),	whereby			D	is	a	determinable	iff	D	is	a	pair	(S,	f)	where:		(i)	S	is	a	metric	space;	and		(ii)	f	is	a	function	from	concrete	particulars	into	the	points	of	this	metric	space		S	defines	the	possible	classificatory	locations	and	how	they	are	related	and	the	points	of	this	space	represent	the	determinates.	The	function	f	defines	which	particulars	go	where	on	the	classification,	or	in	other	words,	it	determines	their	extension.	d	is	then	a	determinatea	iff	d	is	a	pair	(D,	Ei)	where	:		(i)	D	is	a	determinable;	and		(ii)	Ei	is	the	extension	of	point	i	in	the	metric	space	encoded	by	D.			This	captures	the	idea	that	the	identity	of	any	determinate	is	bound	up	with	its	determinable	so	that	each	determinate	can	be	said	to	belong	to	its	determinable.	Furthermore,	no	particular	manifests	(to	use	a	more	neutral	term	than	‘instantiates’)	more	than	one	determinate	belonging	to	a	given	determinable;	if	a	particular	manifests	some	determinate,	it	also	falls	under	its	determinable;	and	if	a	particular	falls	under	a	determinable,	it	manifests	some	determinate	or	other	of	that	determinable.	However,	this	schema	entails	no	constraints	on	the	manifestation	of	determinates	belonging	to	distinct	determinables,	or	on	which	determinate	of	a	given	determinable	a	particular	falling	under	it	must	manifest.		 Significantly,	it	encodes	a	general	metaphysical	picture	of	properties	that	elevates	the	distinction	between	determinables	and	their	determinates	from	what	might	be	viewed	as	a	local	curiosity	to	a	central	feature	of	the	nature	of	




dispositions,	corresponding	to	the	different	symmetries.	Perhaps,	instead,	one	could	associate	the	relevant	properties	of	‘the	world’	with	the	appropriate	laws.	But	then	the	world-as-a-whole,	understood	as	a	particular,	seems	metaphysically	otiose	as	it	is	the	laws	that	would	be	the	actual	seats	of	the	relevant	dispositions.			 Thus,	it	would	seem	that,	regarded	as	metaphysical	tools,	both	the	standard	dispositional	account	and	the	above	shifted	version	are	not	fit	for	structuralist	purposes.	Nevertheless,	there	are	other	devices	in	the	toolbox	that	could	be	appropriated.		 There	is,	for	example,	a	long	history	of	understanding	modality	‘in	the	world’,	as	it	were,	in	terms	of	potentiality.	Vetter	has	recently	taken	this	further	and	elaborated	the	notion	through	a	formal	framework	that	analyses	it	in	terms	of	predicate	logic	with	identity	together	with	the	predicate	operator	POT	(Vetter	2015).	Within	such	a	framework,	the	claim	that	‘It	is	possible	that	P’	is	defined	as:	‘Something	has	an	iterated	potentiality	for	it	to	be	the	case	that	P’	(ibid.,	p.	197).	Since	potentiality	comes	in	degrees,	Vetter	characterises	it	in	terms	of	the	determinable-determinate	relationship,	again,	whereby	the	specific	degrees	to	which	a	particular	determinable	can	be	possessed	are	its	determinates;	so	a	concrete	block	is	less	breakable	than	that	standard	philosophical	example,	a	porcelain	vase,	the	two	objects	possessing	different	determinates	of	the	determinable	‘breakability’. 	 We	can	see	how	this	plays	out	in	the	case	of	laws.	Previously	Vetter	identified	a	metaphysical	gap	between	the	dispositions	possessed	by	particular	objects	and	the	laws	that	are	typically	claimed	to	supervene	on	the	latter.	Standardly,	the	Stimulus	and	Manifestation	Condition	is	invoked	in	order	to	obtain	the	relevant	law	from	the	particular	dispositions;	so,	the	idea	is	that	Coulomb’s	Law	can	be	obtained	from	a	metaphysical	consideration	of	repeated	iterations	of	a	test	charge	being	used	to	stimulate	the	appropriate	manifestation	from	a	given	charge	(Bird	2007).	However,	as	Vetter	noted,	all	that	we	obtain	in	such	cases	is	the	conjunction	‘charge	x	experiences	a	force	f1	when	brought	to	a	distance	r1	from	charge	y’	&	‘charge	x	experiences	a	force	f2	when	brought	to	a	distance	r2	from	charge	y’	&	…	so	on.	There	is,	in	effect,	a	gap	between	such	a	conjunction	and	the	law	statement	itself	(Vetter	2009).			 According	to	her	potentiality	account,	we	should	view	such	situations	quite	differently:	objects	that	have	charge	have	a	certain	potentiality	to	exert	a	force	in	accordance	with	Coulomb’s	Law	and	they	have	this	potentiality	to	a	maximum	degree;	thus	electric	charge	is	identified	as	the	maximal	potentiality	to	exert	a	force.	In	effect,	then,	Vetter’s	account	identifies	the	nomological	disposition	with	the	determinate	of	potentiality	(understood	as	a	determinable).	And	on	this	basis	she	claims	to	derive	Coulomb’s	Law	(Vetter	2015	p.	286).		 However,	there	is	still	a	gap:	Coulomb’s	Law	can	be	understood	as	metaphysically	necessary	only	if	the	identification	of	charge	with	maximal	potentiality	is	necessary.	But	why	should	we	accept	this?	Here	we	have	a	gap	in	explaining	the	status	of	the	metaphysical	necessity	of	Coulomb’s	Law.		 One	option	is	to	adopt	a	‘shallow’	view	of	laws	à	la	Hume	or	Lewis	(again	we	might	refer	back	to	our	discussion	of	Paul’s	view	here).	Thus	Vetter	suggests	that	we	add	potentialities	to	the	‘natural	properties’	that	underpin	the	regularities	in	the	Humean	‘mosaic’	(ibid.,	p.	289).	Leaving	aside	the	point	that	such	a	suggestion	would	send	both	Hume	and	Lewis	spinning	in	their	respective	graves,	it	effectively	introduces	further	metaphysics	in	order	to	bridge	a	gap	that	
was	created	by	adopting	a	certain	metaphysical	stance	in	the	first	place:	namely	one	that	is	oriented	towards	an	ontology	of	particulars.		
 If	we	drop	this	stance	and	instead	of	pursuing	what	is	in	effect	a	‘bottom	up’	approach,	take	things	from	the	top	down,	then	an	alternative	option	emerges:	we	deny	the	existence	of	any	metaphysical	gap	in	the	first	place	by	ascribing	the	relevant	potentialities	directly	to	the	laws	and	symmetries	that	(partly)	constitute	the	structure	of	the	world	(French	2018).	Appropriating	Vetter’s	account	as	a	tool	would	then	offer	one	way	of	metaphysically	characterising	the	sense	in	which	the	world-as-structure	is	inherently	modal.	Take	our	old	friend	PI	one	more	time	and	the	way	it	encompasses	more	possibilities	than	the	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	that	we	observe	in	this	the	actual	world:	there	is	the	potential	–	fleetingly	realised	in	the	1960s	in	the	case	of	quarks	–	for	non-standard	statistics	to	be	manifested.		 Now,	there	may	appear	to	be	a	problem	here,	which	can	be	seen	if	we	compare	this	structuralist	view	with	that	of	Sider	(2011).	On	Sider’s	account	the	fundamental	structure	is	given	by	first-order	quantification	theory,	set	theory	plus	fundamental	physics	and	Vetter	comments	that	‘[i]f	the	fundamental	physics	is	part	of	the	structure	of	the	world,	then	the	world	has	no	potentialities	to	have	a	different	physical	outlook.’	(2015,	p.	260).	However,	this	is,	again,	to	take	a	bottom-up	and	particular-oriented	stance.	If,	for	example,	we	take	our	‘fundamental	physics’	to	embrace	symmetry	principles	(as	determinables)	then	we	arrive	at	an	entirely	different	destination,	where	the	potentiality	to	‘have	a	different	physical	outlook’	is	encoded	(mathematically)	in	the	relevant	structure	(not	forgetting	the	role	of	the	relevant	‘existential	witnesses’).7				 Referring	back	to	the	debate	over	the	metaphysics	of	laws,	the	structuralist	offers	a	perspective	that	can	perhaps	be	described	as	a	‘third	way’	between	both	the	Humean	and	the	dispositionalist.	Insofar	as	the	former	identifies	laws,	understood	as	represented	by	the	relevant	axioms	in	some	‘best	system’,	with	regularities	in	the	mosaic,	laws	are	‘in’	the	world,	albeit	stripped	of	any	modality	on	this	account.	Insofar	as	the	latter	reduces	that	modality	to	that	of	the	underlying	dispositions	or	powers,	the	laws	themselves	may	be	eliminated	(Mumford	2004)	and	hence	cannot	be	taken	to	be	‘in’	the	world.	According	to	the	structuralist,	however,	the	laws	are	both	modally	informed	and	‘in’	the	world	–	indeed,	they	are,	in	part,	the	world!8			 Furthermore,	such	a	perspective	offers	a	different	view	of	the	contentious	issue	of	the	supposed	governing	role	of	laws.	As	already	touched	on	above,	such	a	role	presupposes	a	metaphysical	‘gap’	between	the	laws	and	the	phenomena	they	are	supposed	to	govern.	Humeans,	of	course,	do	not	see	any	such	gap	and	thus	deny	such	a	role	but	then	they	must	face	the	problem	of	the	‘explanatory	circle’:	how	can	laws	explain	the	phenomena	if,	on	the	Humean	account,	they	are,	ultimately,	identified	with	the	phenomena	(see,	for	example,	Dorst	2019)?	Dispositionalists,	on	the	other	hand	typically	accept	such	a	governing	role	but	as	Mumford	has	argued,	if	the	laws	‘flow	from’	or	supervene	on	the	underlying	powers	or	dispositions	of	the	relevant	particulars	(something	that	Vetter	disputes	as	we	have	seen),	then	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	they	can	be	said	to	govern	the	behaviour	of	the	latter.	On	the	structuralist	view,	just	as	in	Paul’s	approach,	there	is	no	metaphysical	gap	in	the	above	sense,	nor	is	there	any	governing	role	for	laws,	or	symmetries	to	play,	again	in	the	above	sense.	Nevertheless,	we	can	still	understand	their	explanatory	function	by,	for	example,	
appealing	to	the	Woodwardian	framework.	Once	again,	consider	PI:	we	can	explain	its	role	in	explaining	phenomena	such	as	that	of	the	halting	of	the	collapse	of	white	dwarf	stars	(French	and	Saatsi	2018)	by	appealing	to	the	potential	alternative	representations	encoded	within	the	principle.	Note,	however,	in	denying	the	above	metaphysical	gap,	this	does	not	negate	the	need	for	some	account	of	the	relationship	between	such	symmetries	and	laws	and	specific	measurement	outcomes,	but	that	would	involve,	as	we	have	seen,	some	choice	of	an	interpretation	of	quantum	theory.		 Returning,	finally,	to	our	twin	motivations,	a	further	worry	arises,	to	the	effect	that	this	appeal	to	‘existential	witnesses’	in	pinning	down	the	possible	structures	to	one	that	is	fit	for	purpose	in	the	context	of	modern	physics,	generates	a	form	of	context-dependence	that	undermines	the	other	motivation	regarding	structure	retention	through	theory	change.	The	core	of	this	concern	consists	in	the	claim	that	modal	relations	that	are	relative	to	an	epistemic	context	cannot	be	regarded	as	fundamental	‘in	a	world’	where	that	context	holds	(see	Ruyant,	forthcoming).	Since	the	modal	relations	sketched	above	in	terms	of	PI	are	indeed	relative	to	the	particular	epistemic	context	in	which	we	find	ourselves	they	cannot	be	regarded	as	fundamental,	or	so	the	argument	goes.			 The	example	given	is	that	of	early	theories	of	light	that	only	hold	in	the	absence	of	magnetic	fields.	If	we	take	it	as	necessary	that,	in	the	context	where	there	are	no	magnetic	fields,	the	angle	of	reflection	of	alight	beam	is	equal	to	the	angle	of	incidence,	it	does	not	follow	that	in	that	context,	it	is	necessary	that	the	angle	of	reflection	of	alight	beam	is	equal	to	the	angle	of	incidence.	That	would	only	be	the	case	if	the	context	were	necessary	but	‘[t]he	fact	that	there	is	no	magnetic	field	at	some	place	in	the	universe	is	not	necessary	but	contingent.	’	(ibid.,	p.	9).	That	is	seen	to	be	problematic	for	the	structural	realist	insofar	as	the	relevant	law	of	angles	cannot	be	taken	to	correspond	to	the	fundamental	modal	structure	of	the	world	but	only	to	the	structure	given	that	particular	context;	that	is,	it	is	relative	to	that	context.			 An	obvious	move	would	be	to	say	that	the	given	modal	statement	approximates	the	relevant	necessary	law	but	then	it	is	unclear	how	to	measure	the	extent	of	such	approximation	(ibid.).	Consider	another	example,	that	of	Galileo’s	law	of	free	fall	which	can	be	taken	as	retained	in	contemporary	theories	in	the	sense	given	by	Post’s	Correspondence	Principle	(1971).	Yet	the	range	of	contexts	in	which	it	does	so	is,	of	course,	tiny	and	the	law	is	highly	contingent,	to	the	extent	that	it	seems	implausible	to	claim	that	it	in	any	way	approximates	the	supposedly	necessary	laws	of	General	Relativity	(Ruyant	forthcoming).	Alternatively	one	might	emphasise	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	laws	that	the	structural	realist	is	focussing	on	but,	it	is	argued,	the	analysis	can	be	applied	‘quite	straightforwardly’:	a	modal	relation	that	states	that	it	is	necessary	that	R,	say,	cannot	count	as	fundamental	in	a	world	where	it	is	the	case	that	‘it	is	necessary	that	in	context	C,	R	holds’	(ibid.,	p.	13).		 Of	course,	such	judgments	of	context	dependence	and	hence	modal	relativity	are	all	made	in	retrospect.	At	the	time	at	which	he	supposedly	proposed	his	law,	Galileo	was	not	aware	of	its	highly	limited	range	of	applicability.	Thus	the	above	concern	might	be	folded	into	the	attitude	of	fallibility	which	all	realists	should	adopt:	from	our	current	epistemic	vantage	point	we	may	not	be	aware	of	the	extent	of	the	context	in	which	our	currently	held	laws	and	theories	hold.	And	of	course,	we	currently	take	to	be	fundamental	
those	laws	and	principles	that	we	(currently)	believe	to	hold	across	all	possible	contexts;	that	is,	we	identify	the	relevant	context	with	the	fundamental	level,	with	the	caveat,	of	course,	that	we	may	discover	that	this	level	is	not,	in	fact,	the	most	fundamental.			 Indeed,	take	the	Standard	Model,	undergirded	as	it	is	by	PI	and	other	symmetry	principles:	we	know,	or	at	least	strongly	suspect,	that	this	cannot	be	the	fundamental	‘theory	of	everything’,	not	least	because	quantum	field	theory,	on	which	it	is	built,	is	widely	regarded	as	‘merely’	an	effective	field	theory,	applicable	only	over	a	certain	energy	range,	and,	of	course,	it	does	not	incorporate	gravity.	So	we	can	accept	that	the	modal	force	of	PI	is	limited	to	this	particular	context	but	then	the	motivation	for	structural	realism	was	always	to	come	up	with	a	form	of	realism	appropriate	for	current	physics	–		the	context	dependence	was	always	there,	right	from	the	start.	And	of	course,	that	context	is	delineated,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	relevant	‘existential	witnesses’;	again,	our	world	is	a	bosonic	and	fermionic	world,	not	a	parastatistical	one.	But	for	modal	relations	to	be	‘in’	a	world	in	the	first	place	they	must	be	tied	to	that	world	via	certain	existential	witnesses	that	delineate	the	relevant	epistemic	context.	Far	from	undermining	structural	realism,	this	incorporation	of	determinates	as	a	feature	of	the	structure	à	la	Cassirer	yields	an	account	fit	to	represent	this,	the	actual,	world.				
5.	Conclusion	Finally,	let	us	return	to	our	original	question,	what	is	structure?	I	have	suggested	that	to	answer	this	question	we	need	to	deploy	certain	tools	appropriated	from	the	toolbox	of	metaphysics	and	as	in	the	case	of	objects,	alternative	options	are	available.	So,	for	example,	following	Paul,	we	could	take	structure	to	be	a	‘fusion’	of	properties	in	the	sense	outlined	above.	However,	although	I	am	sympathetic	to	her	attempt	to	construct	a	one-category	ontology,	fusion	as	a	tool	is	problematic	inasmuch	as	it	has	no	mathematico-physical	correlate.	That's	not	an	issue	with	the	other	‘tool’	that	I’ve	looked	at,	namely	the	determinable-determinate	relationship.	In	that	case,	rather	than	starting	with	the	metaphysics,	we	begin	with	this	idea	of	properties	‘dropping	out’	of	the	symmetries,	where	this	is	represented	mathematically	by	the	relationship	between	the	relevant	group	and	its	representations	and	can,	I	suggest	here,	be	captured	via	devices	such	as	Danby’s,	viewed	through	the	lens	of	the	Poincaré	manoeuvre	of	course.			 This	generates	the	further	worry	about	what,	exactly,	the	metaphysics	is	contributing	in	this	latter	case.	One	answer	is	that	it	contributes	to	our	understanding	by	playing	a	kind	of	umbrella	role	in	covering	both	‘everyday’	examples	and	the	more	arcane	situations	that	we	find	in	modern	physics	(Chakravartty	2013;	French	2018).	Thus	consider	again	the	further	tool	of	potentiality	taken	from	Vetter’s	work.	Her	account	is	heavily	focussed	on	the	language	of	possibility	that	we	use	in	everyday	life:	for	her,	adjectives	such	as	‘fragile’	express	the	relevant	sense	of	potentiality	at	this	level.	When	it	comes	to	physics,	the	language	is	different,	of	course,	and	it	is	the	mathematics	of	group	theory	that	acts	as	the	language	in	terms	of	which	the	relevant	symmetries	are	expressed.	As	in	the	case	of	our	everyday	talk,	we	can	take	this	as	revealing	or	encoding	the	relevant	possibilities	and	what	the	deployment	of	the	tool	of	potentiality	allows	us	to	do	is	to	conceive	of	this	encoding	in	terms	that	can	be	
related	to	other	forms	of	potentiality,	including	those	exhibited	by	fragile	vases	in	‘everyday’	life.	It	is	through	such	connections	that	we	may	then	achieve	a	measure	of	understanding	(French	2018;	for	a	response	see	Vetter	2018).		 In	conclusion	then,	there	is	a	range	of	devices	in	the	toolbox	we	can	use	to	make	further	sense	of	these	options.	The	trick	is	to	ensure	the	tool	is	‘fit	for	purpose’	when	it	comes	to	the	physics	but	even	if	it	isn’t,	it	can	sometimes	be	beaten	into	shape!				
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Philosophy	of	Science	63:	607-625.		Wolff,	J.	(2019),	‘Why	Eliminativism?’	Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science	74:	16-21.		Worrall,	J.	(1989),	‘Structural	realism:	The	Best	of	Both	Worlds?’	Dialectica	43:	99–124.																																																												*	Based	on	my	presentation	at	the	Structure	of	Reality	and	the	Reality	of	Structure	conference	in	Rotterdam,	June	2019.	Huge	thanks	to	Fred	Muller	for	organising	the	conference	and	to	Anjan	Chakravartty,	James	Ladyman,	Laura	Felline,	Kerry	McKenzie,	Fred	again,	Simon	Saunders,	David	Schroeren	and	others	for	comments	and	fruitful	discussions.	1	However,	he	subsequently	shifted	his	response	to	the	underdetermination,	from	an	‘eliminativist’	stance	towards	objects	to	one	that	allows	for	a	‘thin’	metaphysical	conception	of	them	(see	French	and	Ladyman	2011).	2	There	remains	the	concern	as	to	how	the	relevant	symmetry	is	broken	without	introducing	an	extraneous	element,	that	effectively	plays	the	same	role	as	the	classical	environment,	or	consciousness,	or	a	probability	‘field’;	that	is,	some	account	has	to	be	given	of	how	a	given	sub-structure	can	break	the	symmetry	associated	with	another.	As	Lombardi	acknowledges	(Lombardi	2019,	p.	47),	there	is	more	work	to	be	done	here,	perhaps	invoking	a	‘closed-system’	account	of	decoherence.	(I’m	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	and	Juha	Saatsi	for	discussions	on	this.)		3	And	it	still	is,	at	least	within	the	general	philosophy	of	science	community,	suggesting	there	is	further	proselytization	to	be	done!	4	Comparisons	can	also	be	drawn	with	Chakravartty’s	incorporation	of	a	version	of	bundle	theory	into	his	structurally	inclined	‘semi-realism’	(Chakravartty	2007;	cf.	also	Lombardi	2019	for	a	
																																																								quantum	mechanical	rendering)	and	also	with	Schaffer’s	monism,	insofar	as	we	might	conceive	of	the	‘world-bundle’	as	a	fusion	of	qualitative	properties	with	spatio-temporal	locations.	5	Echoing	Wilson,	Paul	acknowledges	that	determinables	might	be	among	the	fundamental	properties	and	relations.	6	Eddington	famously	deployed	a	similar	move	with	regard	to	the	rotation	group	in	quantum	mechanics	(see	French	2014,	p.	87).	7	There	is	more	to	say	about	the	comparison	between	Sider’s	structuralism	and	ontic	structural	realism	but	that	should	wait	for	another	opportunity	(but	see	lectures	4	and	5	in	Sider’s	John	Locke	Lectures:	https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/john-locke-lectures).	8	Crucially	what	the	Humean	and	the	dispositionalist	also	omit	or	cannot	accommodate	are	the	symmetries,	although	for	moves	in	the	right	direction	when	it	comes	to	the	former,	see	Daguid	forthcoming.		
